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THE RES JUDICATA IMPLICATIONS
OF PENDENT JURISDICTION
By exercising pendent jurisdiction,' a federal court may hear
a state or federal claim 2 that is closely related to the federal claim
before it when no independent basis for federal jurisdiction
exists.' Many of the rationales for pendent jurisdiction also sup-
port the doctrine of res judicata.4 Both doctrines promote judi-
cial economy, fairness, finality, and the convenience of the
parties.'
I The exercise of pendent jurisdiction comports with the "cases and controversies"
clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819-20 (1824). Although a judicially created doctrine, pendent
jurisdiction is consistent with the statute authorizing general federal question jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.G. § 1331 (1976) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy ... arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States .... ). "Civil action" reasonably includes the pendent state
claim as well as the underlying federal claim. The statute arguably falls short of the article
III jurisdictional grant. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHsLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 921 n.1 (2d ed. 1973).
2 Although pendent jurisdiction usually concerns a related state daim, the pendent
claim can be a federal claim. When a plaintiff asserts a federal claim that fails to meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), for example, the claim pre-
sents no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
550 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 425 (1970).
s See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3567 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
" Res judicata requires that a plaintiff litigate his entire claim in one judicial proceed-
ing and precludes him from reasserting it in a later action against the same defendant
or a party in privity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
[§ 62] [Throughout this Note the corresponding section numbers that will appear in the
final Restatement Second are given in brackets after citation to the tentative drafts]; Vestal,
Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 IowA L. REV. 1 (1968); Vestal, Res JudicatalClaim Preclusion:
Judgment For the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 357 (1967).
In this Note, "res judicata" refers to claim preclusion as distinguished from issue pre-
clusion. Claim preclusion bars a plaintiff from reasserting the same claim; issue preclusion
prevents the relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in a prior action. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68-68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§§ 27-28]. For
a discussion of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, see Cleary, Res Judicata Reex-
amined, 57 YALE LJ. 339 (1948); Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court Judgment, 42 TENN. L.
REv. 635 (1975).
Merger and bar are the two branches of claim preclusion. When a plaintiff wins a suit,
his claim is "merged" with the judgment; when he loses a suit, he is "barred" from reas-
serting the same claim in a subsequent action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§
47-48 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§§ 18-19]; see generally Martin, The Restatement (Second)
of Judgments: An Overview, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 406-10 (1981).
See notes 8-12 and accompanying text infra.
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The Restatement (Second) of Judgments would bar a plaintiff
from asserting a related state claim after omitting it in an earlier
federal action if the federal court would have exercised pendent
jurisdiction over the state claim.6 The proper application of the
Restatement Second rule is unclear, however, because the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction is discretionary.7 This Note examines the re-
lationship between res judicata and pendent jurisdiction in various
procedural contexts. It concludes that the preclusive effect of the
initial judgment should depend upon the grounds on which the
federal court disposed of the federal claim and the amount of
judicial resources expended in the federal action, as measured by
the timing of the dismissal.
I
POLICY, THE RESTATEMENT SECOND,
AND THE GIBBS DOCTRINE
Res judicata seeks to conserve judicial resources,8 prevent
vexatious litigation, and promote the finality of judgments.' Pen-
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978)
[§ 25] provides:
A given claim may find support in theories or grounds arising from both state
and federal law. When the plaintiff brings an action on the claim in a court,
either state or federal, in which there is no jurisdictional obstacle to his advanc-
ing both theories or grounds, but he presents only one of them, and judgment
is entered with respect to it, he may not maintain a second action in which he
tenders the other theory or ground. If however, the court in the first action
would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or
ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise it as a
matter of discretion), then a second action in a competent court presenting the
omitted theory or ground should be held not precluded.
There are few reported decisions concerning the problem of the relationship between
res judicata and pendent jurisdiction. The fact pattern at issue is relatively rare; it presup-
poses that (1) no diversity of citizenship exists, (2) the plaintiff omits a related state claim in
federal court, (3) the plaintiff then asserts the related state claim in a subsequent judicial
proceeding, and (4) the defendant raises the defense of res judicata in the subsequent
action. See note 15 infra.
7 See notes 27-37 and accompanying text infra.
' Claim preclusion promotes judicial economy to the extent that courts define "claim"
broadly. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 24]
adopts a broad definition:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar ... the claim extin-
guished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transac-
tions, out of which the action arose. (2) What factual grouping constitutes a
"transaction," and what groupings constitute a "series," are to be determined
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dent jurisdiction also promotes judicial economy and the interests
of litigants. It permits parties to resolve state and federal claims
arising from the same factual situation I0 in a single forum, thus
reducing litigation costs and the possibility of inconsistent
judgments." Pendent jurisdiction also broadens access to the
federal courts.'2
To give the proper preclusive effect to a federal action in
which the plaintiff omitted a related state claim,"3 courts must
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are re-
lated in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expecta-
tions or business understanding or usage.
Under this expansive definition, different theories of recovery flowing from one factual
unit constitute one claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1978) [§ 25].
See note 4 supra.
o See note 23 infra.
For a general discussion of the development and policies served by pendent jurisdic-
tion, see Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262
(1968).
12 One commentator has forcefully argued that the primary purpose of pendent juris-
diction is to provide plaintiffs with both federal and state claims a true choice of forum.
Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75
Nw. U.L. REv. 245 (1980). Without pendent jurisdiction, plaintiffs with both federal and
state claims would hesitate to bring suit in federal court because they could not litigate the
entire controversy there. Id. at 255-56.
"S To determine the preclusive effect of the initial action, the court in the subsequent
action must decide which res judicata law to apply. Of course, if most state courts adopt
the Restatement Second, the choice of law problem will largely disappear. For an excellent
discussion of the effect in a later action of a federal court judgment, see Degnan, Federal-
ized ResJudicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
The full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, applies only when both
courts are state courts. When a state court renders the initial judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1976) directs all courts, federal and state, to give the judgment full faith and credit.
Furthermore, the statute mandates that state court judgments "shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such [s]tate ... from which they are taken." See Hazen Research, Inc. v.
Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding full faith and credit
given to prior state court action).
Congress has never indicated what effect a federal or state court must give to another
federal court's judgment. When a federal court renders the initial judgment, the problem
is one of res judicata and not of full faith and credit. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171
(1938). One federal court, commenting on 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976), stated, "This legislative
annexation appears entirely appropriate as necessary and proper for the operation of
courts ... and the courts have adopted no less expansive a policy, easily reading into
§ 1738 a requirement that state courts extend full respect to the judgments of federal
judicial tribunals...." Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d at 153 n.1.
Professor Degnan expounds the emerging principle as follows: "A valid judgment ren-
dered in any judicial system within the United States must be recognized by all other
judicial systems within the United States, and the claims and issues precluded by that judg-
ment ... are determined by the law of the system which rendered the judgment." Degnan,
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analyze the relationship between res judicata and pendent
jurisdiction.1 4  The Restatement Second provides a general rule for
determining the preclusive effect of an omitted state claim: if the
federal court could have exercised pendent jurisdiction over the
omitted state claim, the plaintiff may not assert it in any subse-
quent action, 5 unless the federal court clearly would have declined
to exercise pendent jurisdiction. 6 The Restatement Second rule is
based on the Supreme Court's clarification and expansion of pen-
dent jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.7 In Gibbs, the
Court distinguished and described the two components of pen-
dent jurisdiction: power and discretion. A court has the power to
hear a pendent state claim if it has subject matter jurisdiction over
supra, at 773 (emphasis omitted). The drafters of the Restatement Second incorporated this
view in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 135 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 87]:
"Federal law determines the effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a
federal court."
Professor Casad suggests that in certain situations, the court in the subsequent action
can give a greater preclusive effect to a judgment than would the rendering court. See
Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL
L. REv. 510, 519-28 (1981).
"4 The Supreme Court recognized this relationship in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966): "[T]he weighty policies of judicial economy and fairness to par-
ties reflected in resjudicata doctrine were in themselves strong counsel for the adoption of
a rule which would permit federal courts to dispose of the state as well as the federal
claims." The Gibbs Court, however, did not discuss the res judicata implications of a
plaintiff's omission of a related state claim in federal court. See Comment, The Expanding
Scope of Federal Pendent Jurisdiction, 34 TENN. L. REv. 413, 420 (1967).
The relationship between res judicata and pendent jurisdiction is similar to that be-
tween res judicata and compulsory counterclaims. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) compels a defen-
dant to assert any counterdaim arising out of the same "transaction or occurrence" as the
plaintiff's claim. The decisions vary when a defendant omits his compulsory counterclaim
in federal court and then asserts it as plaintiff in a state court that has no compulsory
counterclaim rule. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Haney, 235 Miss. 60, 70, 108 So. 2d 227,
231 (1959) (plaintiff permitted to assert claim in latter action); Horne v. Woolever, 170
Ohio St. 178, 182, 163 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1959) (plaintiff barred from asserting claim in
latter action), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960); London v. Philadelphia, 412 Pa. 496, 500,
194 A.2d 901, 902 (1963) (plaintiff barred from asserting claim in latter action). Neverthe-
less, the res judicata-pendent jurisdiction problem is more complex because the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction is discretionary. See notes 27-37 and accompanying text infra.
'" Assuming no diversity of citizenship, see note 6 supra, the plaintiff must bring his
second action in state court because the federal courts lack jurisdiction over his state claim.
If the court exercised diversity jurisdiction in the initial action, ordinary principles of res
judicata would bar the plaintiff from asserting the state claim in a subsequent action. See
note 6 supra. If diversity jurisdiction arose during the period between suits, the plaintiff
could commence the second action in federal court. Because the res judicata law of the
rendering forum applies, see note 13 supra, the forum of the second action is irrelevant.
This Note assumes that the second action is in state court.
6 See note 6 supra.
17 383 U.S. 715 (1966). For a discussion of the effect of Gibbs on the pendent jurisdic-
tion doctrine, see Note, UMW v. Gibbs And Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REv. 657
(1968).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:608
the underlying federal claim,18 and the state claim is sufficiently
related to the federal claim. 9 A federal court has subject matter
jurisdiction over federal question claims that are not frivolous or
asserted solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction."0
Federal courts typically exercise broad discretion in deciding
whether an underlying federal claim survives a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2
1
," United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
19 Of course, the court must also have jurisdiction over the person to adjudicate either
the federal or the state claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1978) [§ 1] states in relevant part, "A court has authority to render judgment in an
action when ... [t]he party against whom judgment is to be rendered has submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court .. " This requirement applies to both federal and state courts and
is certainly not unique to pendent jurisdiction.
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Court clar-
ified the conditions under which a federal court has jurisdiction to decide a federal ques-
tion. The Court stated:
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by
the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which
petitioners could actually recover.... [A] suit may sometimes be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal
statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivo-
lous.
Id. at 682-83. See also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 3, § 3564. In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528
(1974), the Supreme Court applied the Bell substantiality test, but admitted that it is an
unworkable standard. Id. at 538.
21 See Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he procedure of
rendering a final dismissal for want of jurisdiction should be utilized sparingly."). When
prior court decisions leave no doubt as to an alleged federal claim's unsoundness, the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of
N.Y. Auth., 270 F. Supp. 947, 950 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1967). In
Spector v. LQ Motor Inns, Inc., 517 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1055 (1976), the court held that the court below should have considered the merits of a
federal securities fraud claim asserted in a novel factual setting before determining the
question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 835 (1968), illustrates the extent of the district court judge's discretionary power. The
plaintiff brought suit on both a federal patent infringement theory and a state unfair
competition theory. The plaintiff offered no evidence at trial on his federal theory of
recovery. Nevertheless, the district court held for the plaintiff on the state claim. On
appeal, the Second Circuit intimated that the district court should have been aware of the
frivolity of the federal claim before trial, but held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding the state claim. Id. at 21-22. Because appellate courts recognize that
they have the benefit of hindsight, they rarely overrule lower courts' jurisdictional deter-
minations.
Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1974), provides another example
of extreme deference to the district court. In Kavit, Judge Friendly stated,
In retrospect it appears clear that this simple $3000 negligence claim by a
customer against his broker should never have been tried in a federal court.
Yet by the time [the judge] inherited the case for trial, the parties and the court
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Under Gibbs, once a court determines that it has jurisdiction
over a federal claim, 22 it can exercise pendent jurisdiction to hear
a state claim only if both claims derive from "a common nucleus
of operative fact" 2 and the plaintiff "would ordinarily be ex-
had both invested a significant amount of time in it.
Id. at 1183. Upholding the trial court's decision to hear the state claim, Judge Friendly
emphasized the judicial economy policy underlying pendent jurisdiction. Id.
22 If the district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it has no
power to hear either the underlying federal or the pendent state claim. Similarly, an appel-
late court reversal of a district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction voids the
judgment on both the federal and state claims, even after a full trial on the merits. Thus,
competency is a requirement of central importance. See Broderick v. Associate Hosp.
Servs., 536 F.2d 1, 8 n.25 (3d Cir. 1976) ("There is no question that a federal court has the
power to entertain a pendent state claim where the federal claim has substance.... Having
properly held that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction, we cannot say that the
district court erred in dismissing the entire action."); Elberti v. Kunsman, 376 F.2d 567,
568 (3d Cir. 1967) (reversing district court on jurisdictional issue) ("The retention of juris-
diction of the claim based on state law may be sustained as proper only if the federal
question was substantial."); Foreman v. General Motors Corp., 473 F. Supp. 166, 181 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) ("[T]he pendent claims ... have no independent federal jurisdiction and can-
not continue if the federal claims are dismissed [for lack of jurisdiction]."); Braden v.
University of Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp. 836, 840 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ("Lack of jurisdiction with
respect to the [federal claims], however, precludes the assumption of pendent jurisdiction
at this stage of the proceeding."), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 11] ("A
judgment may properly be rendered against a party only if the court has authority to
adjudicate....").
2 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan stated:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever ... the rela-
tionship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion
that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
"case'.... The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state char-
acter, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding, then ... there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
In Southeastern Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n v. Walthour Agency, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 781, 784
(N.D. Ga. 1980), the court stated, "[T]he complaint alleges one loss and describes alterna-
tive theories as to who is responsible. This meets the requirement of a common nucleus of
operative fact." The court also observed that when the federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction over an underlying federal claim, the argument for the exercise of pendent juris-
diction is strengthened, because the plaintiff can secure complete relief only in the federal
forum. Id.
In re Commonwealth OillTesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 227
(W.D. Tex. 1979), presents an interesting example of a court's struggle with the "common
nucleus of operative fact" test. The court refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
some of the state claims alleged because they spanned a greater period of time than the
federal claim. Id. at 248.
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pected to try them ... in one judicial proceeding." 24 The Gibbs
Court's broad definition of a claim for pendent jurisdiction pur-
poses closely resembles the Restatement Second's definition of a
claim for res judicata purposes." The Court recognized that pen-
dent jurisdiction and res judicata are inextricably linked, stating
that a district court's express refusal to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion should not bar the plaintiff from reasserting a related state
claim in a subsequent proceeding. 6
The second component of pendent jurisdiction is
discretion.27 The Gibbs Court provided guidelines for district
court judges to follow in exercising their discretion.28 These
guidelines rest on the policies of federal-state comity and judicial
efficiency. First, federal courts should avoid needlessly deciding
questions of state law. 9 Second, courts should not exercise pen-
14 383 U.S. at 725; see note 23 supra. This requirement is conclusory and adds nothing
to the "common nucleus of operative fact" criterion. See Southeastern Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Walthour Agency, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 781, 784 (N.D. Ga. 1980). But see Schenkier,
supra note 12, at 266-72.
21 See note 8 supra. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), concerning compulsory counterclaims, uses a
"transaction or occurrence" definition of a claim. See note 14 supra. There is no principled
distinction between these definitions; indeed, if they were significantly different, courts
would be unable to readily determine the preclusive effect of a prior action. But see
Schenkier, supra note 12, at 272-75.
' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (dictim). If a federal court
refuses to hear a pendent state claim, fairness dictates that the plaintiff have the opportu-
nity to reassert the state claim in a later proceeding. See In re General Motors Corp.
Engine Interchange Litigation. 594 F.2d 1106, 1134 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing plaintiffs to pur-
sue state remedies in subsequent proceedings; "[tihe [district] court, having declined juris-
diction over the state claims, was without power to extinguish them"); Bowers v. DeVito, 486
F. Supp. 742, 744 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (refusing to hear pendent claim; "the Court ex-
presses no view as to the merits of plaintiff's state law claim. Plaintiff ... remains free to
file his state law claim in the appropriate state forum."); cf. Neeld v. National Hockey
League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying plaintiff leave to amend complaint
to include pendent state claim: "If these theories are presented [later] in a state court, that
court can decide if res judicata applies.").
2 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
28 Id. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), a district court may refuse to hear all claims in one
proceeding and may order separation to further convenience or economy or to avoid prej-
udice. Because the policies promoted by rule 42(b) are similar to those promoted by pen-
dent jurisdiction, the Gibbs guidelines may be relevant in the diversity context as well.
2 "That power [to hear a pendent claim] need not be exercised in every case in which
it is found to exist.... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter
of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
If a state claim presents important issues of state law that have not been resolved by
that state's courts, federal courts should not exercise pendent jurisdiction. See Krueger Co.
v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 804-05 (D. Neb. 1979) ("Where
the proper resolution of the state law question is unclear, a federal court may properly
decline to address the pendent issue.... [T]his Court is ill-equipped ... to analyze the
intentions of the Wisconsin legislature when this law was passed and decisional trends in
614
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dent jurisdiction if the state claim overwhelms the underlying
federal claim."0 Finally, the court must consider the potential of
jury confusion if it tries the federal and state claims together.3 '
The Gibbs Court also emphasized the timing of the dismissal;
when the court dismisses the federal claim before trial, it should
dismiss the state claim as well.32  Dismissal of the state claim in
this situation avoids federal intrusion upon state judicial systems
and discourages plaintiffs from asserting meritless federal claims
to establish a basis for federal jurisdiction over their state claims.
Even if the federal claim is substantial enough to confer the
power to exercise pendent jurisdiction, 3 the court abuses its dis-
cretion by deciding the state claim. Later cases have reaffirmed
the Wisconsin courts."); Grey v. European Health Spas, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 841, 848 (D.
Conn. 1977) ("While this Court has the authority to exercise pendent jurisdiction, it is
certainly under no obligation to do so. [W]here ... the state claim is one of first impres-
sion, it would be inappropriate to decide it."). The Grey court noted that the plaintiff could
seek complete relief in a state court. Id. at 848. Thus, when the federal claim falls within
the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction, the court might wish to hear the pendent state
claim even if important issues of state law are involved, because only the federal court can
adjudicate the entire controversy. See note 23 supra.
' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27; see Mazzare v. Burroughs Corp.,
473 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("Proof of plaintiff's [state] claim ... would ...
involve legal and factual issues different from those in connection with his [federal]
claim.... [The entire scope of the trial would be enlarged.").
" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. The possibility of jury confusion
increases when the plaintiff brings in additional parties using pendent-party jurisdiction.
In Greene v. Emersons, Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court refused to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over defendants who were not involved in the underlying federal
claim. The court stated, "Although the claims against all defendants arise out of the same
general factual background, the federal and state claims are sufficiently different in legal
theory to give rise to risks of confusion or spill-over effect in the minds of the jury ..." Id.
at 74.
32 "Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insub-
stantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well." United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (footnote omitted) (dictum).
" See note 20 supra. The distinction between a motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) (no subject matter jurisdiction) and a motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
(failure to state a cause of action) is important. In federal question cases, courts often blur
the line between the two. When the court dismisses a federal claim pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), it lacks power to hear the state claim and must dismiss it. When the court
dismisses a federal claim prior to trial pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court
should dismiss the state claim as a matter of discretion. See Cahill v. Metallic Lathers Local
46, 473 F. Supp. 1326, 1328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dismissing underlying federal claim for
lack of jurisdiction and properly refusing to hear state claim; erroneously quoting Gibbs
discretion language as support); Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1280 (2d Cir. 1975)
(affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; noting that early dismissal
under 12(b)(6) likewise calls for dismissal of state claim); note 32 supra; notes 63-74 and
accompanying text infra.
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the Gibbs rule with one qualification: " if compelling countervail-
ing reasons,"5 such as the expenditure of substantial judicial re-
sources before dismissal, support the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion after a pretrial dismissal of the federal claim, the court may
hear the state claim.16  Absent such unusual circumstances,
however, the federal courts have followed the Gibbs rule. 7
In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1970), the plaintiff challenged a state
welfare law as violative of the equal protection clause and as incompatible with the Social
Security Act. The Court held that the district court properly heard the pendent federal
claim after dismissing the constitutional claim before trial. The factual and procedural
situation in Rosado provided strong reasons for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. First,
the pendent claim was a federal claim, thus undercutting typical arguments against exercis-
ing pendent jurisdiction such as respect for state judicial systems and federal-state comity.
Because hearing the related federal claim promoted judicial economy, the court properly
exercised pendent jurisdiction. Second, the court dismissed the underlying federal claim
for mootness before trial, "after substantial time and energy [had] been expended." Id. at
404. The Court also noted, "We intimate no view as to whether the situation might have
been different had the [underlying] claim become moot before the District Court had in-
vested substantial time in its resolution." Id. at 404 n.4. For other cases illustrating the
Rosado gloss on Gibbs, see note 36 infra.
-" See Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1280 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[W]e would be inclined to
hold that the retention of jurisdiction for trial of a pendent state law claim on the basis of
a federal question claim already disposed of by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, would be an abuse
of discretion absent unusual circumstances .. "). Thus, when the court dismisses the
federal claim before trial, the fate of the pendent claim depends on the surrrounding
circumstances. See, e.g., In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980) (remanding state
claim for determination on pendent jurisdiction although federal claim dismissed before
trial: "We... return the case to the district court for consideration of whether, under all
the surrounding circumstances, it should accept the state law claim under a discretionary
exercise of pendent jurisdiction thus avoiding further duplicious [sic] judicial efforts.");
Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming exer-
cise of pendent jurisdiction after federal claim dismissed on morning of trial: "We believe
that the district court could properly have concluded that under these facts, the interests of
convenience and judicial economy outweighed the state interest in adjudicating its own
claims."); GEM Corrugated Box Corp. v. National Kraft Container Corp., 427 F.2d 499,
501 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming exercise of pendent jurisdiction after federal claim dismissed
before trial by parties' stipulation); Morris v. Frank IX & Sons, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 728, 735
(W.D. Va. 1980) (refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction after disposing of federal claim
by summary judgment); Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (exercis-
ing pendent jurisdiction after disposing of federal claims by summary judgment); Toensing
v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction
after disposing of federal claim by summary judgment), aff'd, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
Unfortunately, many of the opinions cited above do not fully explain the rationale for
their holdings.
- See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970); In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093,
1105 (5th Cir. 1980); Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir.
1979).
" See, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 616 (8th Cir. 1980);
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1976); CES Publishing
Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1975); Iroquois Indus., Inc.
v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 970 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909
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II
APPLICATION OF THE RESTATEMENT SECOND RULE
When the plaintiff omits a related state claim18 from his
federal suit and later asserts it in state court, the Restatement
Second requires that the state court determine whether the federal
court would have had the power to decide the state claim and
(1970); Cummings v. Virginia School of Cosmetology, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 780, 783 (E.D.
Va. 1979); cf. Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir.
1974) (dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) on appeal); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455
F.2d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The parties would be greatly inconvenienced by having to
retry the [state claim]. It also would be unfair to the parties, who have litigated the issues
in a three day trial in the district court ... especially in view of the 'federal judicial re-
sources' already committed.").
38 The Restatement Second does not directly address the effect of a federal court's ex-
press refusal to hear an asserted pendent claim. Nevertheless, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 25], the language of Gibbs,
see note 26 and accompanying text supra, and the policy of fairness dictate that the state
court permit the plaintiff to reassert his state claim in a subsequent action. See Nichols v.
Canoga Indus., 83 Cal. App. 3d 956, 966, 148 Cal. Rptr. 459, 466 (1978); Penn Mart
Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 352 (Del. Ch. 1972); Ferger v. Local 483, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 94 N.J. Super. 554, 565, 229 A.2d 532,
539 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 97 N.J. Super. 505, 235 A.2d 483 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1967); Salwen Paper Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 385,
389-92, 424 N.Y.S.2d 918, 921-23 (1980); Calhoun v. Supreme Court, 61 Ohio App. 2d 1,
399 N.E.2d 559 (1978); ef. Pottern v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 589 P.2d 1378, 1379
(Colo. App. 1978) (permitting subsequent state action because state claim required differ-
ent degree of culpability than federal claim). But see Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 106
Cal. App. 3d 441, 445, 164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922 (1980) (holding that once district court
refuses to exercise pendent jurisdiction, plaintiff must seek dismissal of federal claim and
take both claims to state court to preserve state claim).
The Mattson court incorrectly looked to RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or JUDGMENTS § 61,
Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 24] to support its holding. This comment con-
cerns a plaintiff who asserts a claim in a court that cannot render a judgment for the full
amount of his claim, such as an inferior state court, and thus assumes that the plaintiff
could obtain complete relief in another court in the same judicial system. Thus, Comment
g did not apply to the Mattson plaintiff, who could not have obtained full relief in any
other federal court.
The predicament of the plaintiff in Mattson is similar to that of a plaintiff who files
suit in state court on a state claim and omits a related federal claim that falls within exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction. Although complete relief may be available to this plaintiff in
federal court, the Restatement Second does not force him into that forum. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 26]; id. Comment c.
Similarly, the Mattson plaintiff, who can secure relief only on his federal claim in federal
court, should not be required to sue in state court to preserve his state claim.
A further problem arises when the federal court fails to state its reason for dismissing
a pendent state claim. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b), unless the dismissal is for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join an indispensable party, it operates with
prejudice if the court does not otherwise specify. Thus, when a court dismisses a pendent
claim without comment under its discretionary powers, rule 41(b) provides that the dismis-
sal is with prejudice; consequently, federal judges should explicitly state that the dismissal
is without prejudice. See McLearn v. Cowen & Co., 48 N.Y.2d 696, 697-99, 397 N.E.2d
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whether it would have decided it as a matter of discretion. 9 If
both claims derive from "a common nucleus of operative fact,"4
the state court must look to the ground on which the federal court
disposed of the federal claim to determine whether that court
had power to hear the state claim. Next, to decide whether the
federal courtwould have exercised its pendent jurisdiction as a
matter of discr'etion, the state court should look to the timing of
the dismissal of the federal claim to measure the judicial resources
expended, as well as other factors." If the state court decides,
based on these factors, that the federal court would have heard
the state claim, res judicata bars the plaintiff in the second action.
A. Full Litigation
When the plaintiff fully litigates his federal claim in federal
court, that court clearly has the power to hear a closely related
pendent claim 42 and will usually choose to exercise pendent juris-
diction. Unless the plaintiff can persuade the state court that the
federal court would have declined pendent jurisdiction because of
the importance of the state claim or because of possible jury
confusion,3 the state court must bar him from bringing a second
action.44 Although courts will not always exercise their discretion
to hear a pendent claim, the Restatement Second forces the plaintiff
to assert his state claim in federal court, or risk forfeiting his right
to pursue it in any other forum.
750, 751-52, 422 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61-62 (1979) (mem.) (district court dismissed federal claim on
pleadings and dismissed state claim without comment; state court held plaintiff's subse-
quent state suit barred). Even without an explicit statement, however, courts should inter-
pret a discretionary dismissal of a pendent claim as without prejudice to ensure that the
Restatement Second, the federal rules, and the Gibbs doctrine mesh properly.
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978)
[§ 25]; see note 6 supra.
40 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725; see note 23 supra.
"' See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra; notes 43-44 and accompanying text
infra.
42 See notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.
4' See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proof on this matter. See, e.g., Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 179-80, 240 S.E.2d
241, 243 (1977) (plaintiff persuaded state court that federal court would not have heard
omitted state constitutional claim of first impression).
4 See Woods Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1312-16
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
85 Cal. App. 3d 143, 154, 149 Cal. Rptr. 320, 326 (1978); Ford Motor Co. v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 676, 681, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62 (1973); McCann v. Whitney, 25
N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1941). But see Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 955-56, 603
P.2d 58, 72, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 155 (1979) (court improperly looked to state res judicata
law to determine dimensions of claim and allowed plaintiff to pursue state claim in state
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Several policies strongly support precluding the plaintiff in
this context. First, fairness dictates that the plaintiff should not
have two opportunities to pursue one claim." Second, the fed-
eral rules liberally allow amendment of pleadings46 and joinder of
claims, 7 giving the plaintiff every chance to assert his related state
claim in the federal action. Furthermore, because the plaintiff
chose the federal forum,48 it is fair to require him to litigate his
court); City of Chicago v. Illinois Fair Empl. Prac. Comm., 87 Ill. App.3d 597, 602-04, 410
N.E.2d 136, 141-42 (1980) (court incorrectly held that res judicata cannot apply if federal
statute does not preempt state law remedy); McKean v. Campbell, 372 So. 2d 652, 654 (La.
Ct. App. 1979) (court improperly looked to state res judicata law to determine dimensions
of daim and allowed plaintiff to pursue state claim in state court.).
McCann v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1941) illustrates the proper applica-
tion of the Restatement Second rule. Plaintiff initially filed suit in federal court alleging viola-
tions of federal antitrust law. After losing two federal actions, plaintiff asserted a state
antitrust claim in state court. The court barred the plaintiff's second action. Id. at 357.
One commentator has argued that the preclusive effect of the federal action in
McCann was too harsh in light of the uncertain state of the law of pendent jurisdiction. See
Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules And State Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1249, 1293-94 (1960). The state
court may wish to give the plaintiff special consideration if the plaintiff commenced the
federal action prior to Gibbs. See Hughes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 336 A.2d 572
(Del.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975). In Hughes, the plaintiffs commenced a federal
antitrust action in 1961. After numerous delays and protracted litigation, theiUnited States
Supreme Court reversed the plaintiffs' judgment in 1973. Id. at 574. The plaintiffs then
brought to trial a common law claim that had been dormant in state court for over ten
years. The Supreme Court of Delaware denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for res
judicata. Id. at 575. The court stressed that the issue of liability was never litigated in the
federal courts because of the defendant's default. Id. The court failed to realize that claim
preclusion does not require actual litigation of issues. See Williamson v. Columbia Gas &
Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). The only
justification for the Hughes decision today is that the federal action had been commenced
prior to Gibbs. The Hughes court, however, did not consider this fact conclusive. 336 A.2d
at 577.
"' Claim preclusion problems do not arise only when the plaintiff loses his initial suit.
In Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 274 A.2d 146 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd per curiam,
282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971), the plaintiff won his initial federal claim and later commenced
an action in state court to recover punitive damages. Res judicata barred the plaintiff from
bringing the subsequent action. Id. at 147-48.
4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
41 See FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
41 When the defendant exercises his right of removal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976), and
thereby forces the plaintiff into federal court, a different rule might be appropriate;
however, many factors support a bar rule in the removal context. First, a no-bar rule might
burden the right of removal; defendants desiring to litigate in federal court might not seek
removal if the plaintiff could later assert a related state claim. Second, the general policies
behind res judicata-finality, efficiency, and preventing vexatious litigation-favor barring
the plaintiff. Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant the federal court its full
powers in an action removed from state court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c). By implication, the
preclusive effect of the court's judgment should not change because the judgment was
rendered in a removed action. Thus, even though removal upsets the plaintiff's choice of
forum, other considerations indicate that the occurrence of removal should be irrelevant to
the proper application of the Restatement Second rule.
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entire claim there." Finally, barring the second action conserves
judicial resources that might otherwise be spent in duplicating the
federal court's efforts.
B. Default Judgment
A default judgment for the plaintiff on a federal claim 0
should preclude a subsequent state court action on an omitted,
related state claim. This result is consistent with the general rule
that default judgments are entitled to full res judicata effect."
The fairness policies that support a rule of bar when the federal
claim is fully litigated 12 also apply in the default context. Fur-
thermore, in a simple default situation, 3 the federal court would
not have fully analyzed the merits of exercising pendent
jurisdiction." Consequently, had the plaintiff initially asserted
49 One commentator has argued that the general rule of barring the plaintiff in a
subsequent action defeats access to the federal courts. See Schenkier, supra note 12, at
272-75. The Restatement Second rule, on the contrary, simply provides symmetry. If the
plaintiff had chosen to litigate his state claim in state court while omitting a related federal
claim (assuming federal jurisdiction is not exclusive), ordinary rules of res judicata would
bar a subsequent action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1, Comment e,
Illustration 11 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§251.
'o See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b). This discussion assumes a simple default, where the defen-
dant fails to answer within 20 days after service of the complaint. If the defendant collater-
ally attacked the judgment successfully, the judgment would be void, and the plaintiff
would be free to bring both claims in either federal or state court. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 113-116 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§§ 65-68].
The defendant could also request the rendering court to provide equitable relief from the
default judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). If the court grants the motion and reinstates
the case for trial, the state court should treat the omitted state claim as if there had been
no default judgment.
" See Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[E]ven a default
judgment operates as res judicata and is conclusive of whatever is essential to support the
judgment."); Slattery v. Maykut, 176 Conn. 147, 157, 405 A.2d 76, 82 (1978) ("[A] judg-
ment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates as res
judicata in the absence of fraud or collusion even if obtained by default .. "); Zalobowski
v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 410 A.2d 436, 437 (Del.
1980) ("The fact that the original action resulted in a default judgment does not render it
any less conclusive an adjudication for purposes of res judicata than a judgment rendered
in an answered case."); Menconi v. Davison, 80 Il. App. 2d 1, 6, 225 N.E.2d 139, 142
(1967); Perry & Derrick Co. v. King, 24 Mich. App. 616, 620, 180 N.W.2d 483, 485-86
(1970); Collins v. Bertram Yacht Corp., 53 A.D.2d 527, 384 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1976).
Apparently, no court has dealt with the issues of pendent jurisdiction and claim preclusion
together in the default context. Although a default judgment precludes a second suit on
the same claim, it cannot serve as a basis for issue preclusion in an action on a different
claim, because no substantive issues could have been actually litigated in the initial action.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
[§ 27].
5 See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 50 supra.
14 See generally 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2685
(1973 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
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the state claim, the federal court would most likely have entered a
default judgment on both claims.
C. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, Improper Venue, or Failure to Join
an Indispensable Party
If the federal court dismisses the federal claim for lack of
personal 5 or subject matter jurisdiction,56 it has no power to en-
tertain a pendent claim. The Restatement Second would require the
state court to allow the plaintiff to pursue his omitted state claim
in a subsequent action.57 Because the federal rules permit the
plaintiff to reassert his federal claim after a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction,58 fairness dictates that the plaintiff may also assert an
omitted state claim in a subsequent state suit. The same rule
should apply when a judgment is reversed on appeal for lack of
jurisdiction; regardless of the judicial resources expended on a
full trial, the trial court lacked the power to hear any pendent
claim the plaintiff might have asserted.
Similarly, when the federal court dismisses the federal claim
for improper venue 9 or for failure to join an indispensable
party,"° the state court should not bar the plaintiff from asserting
"s See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5), motions to dismiss
for insufficiency of process and service, are not treated separately in this Note because
notice, like personal jurisdiction, is constitutionally required. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950). See also RESTrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 1].
Thus, a dismissal under rule 12(b)(4) or 12(b)(5) should be treated the same as a dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
'6 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
The state court must exercise great care in determining the ground for dismissal of
the federal claim. In Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974), the plaintiffs
asserted an unfair price discrimination claim in state court after losing a prior federal
action. The circuit court had reversed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to state a valid cause of action, but carelessly used the term
'jurisdiction" in its opinion. The Utah court properly determined that the federal court
could have decided the state claim had it been asserted and barred the plaintiff from
bringing the second suit. Id. at 382.
1 See Mann v. City of Marshalltown, 265 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978); McAuliffe v.
Colonial Imports, Inc., 116 N.H. 398, 399, 359 A.2d 630, 631 (1976); Gallo v. Mayer, 50
Misc. 2d 385, 387, 270 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ("Trial of the common-law fraud
action will not be foreclosed by a verdict for defendants in the Federal action if the basis of
that verdict is the failure to prove a jurisdictional requirement ... ").
58 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874-75
(3d Cir. 1972); see RESrTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
[§ 20].
'9 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
0 See id. 12(b)(7).
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the omitted state claim in a subsequent proceeding. Courts typi-
cally make these determinations during the pretrial stage, before
they have expended considerable resources. Yet even when the
court dismisses the claim during trial,6 federal procedure allows
the plaintiff to reassert the dismissed federal claim. 62  Likewise,
such a dismissal should not bar the omitted state claim.
D. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim or Pursuant to a Motion for
Summary Judgment
When the federal court dismisses the federal claim on the
pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted,63 res judicata should not bar the plaintiff from later
asserting the omitted state claim in state court.64 Allowing the
plaintiff's subsequent suit reflects the Gibbs guideline that urges
courts to dismiss pendent claims when the underlying federal
claim is dismissed before trial. 5 Because the court disposed of
the federal claim without a significant expenditure of its re-
sources, the judicial economy policy behind res judicata cannot
justify barring the subsequent suit.66 Furthermore, considerations
of fairness also dictate this result. Had the federal court not dis-
missed the claim at the pleading stage, the plaintiff might have
amended his complaint to include the state claim. The Restatement
6! See id. 12(h)(2).
62 Id. 41(b).
See id. 12(b)(6). Disposition of the federal claim pursuant to a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, see id. 12(c), resembles a dismissal pursuant to rule 12(b)(6). Because the
same policies apply in both cases, a judgment on the pleadings on the federal claim should
not bar a subsequent suit on the state claim.
" See Cureton v. Lyman S. Ayers & Co., 153 Ind. App. 495, 502, 287 N.E.2d 904, 908
(1972). In Cureton, the federal court had dismissed the federal claim on the pleadings for
failure to state a cause of action. The state court permitted a subsequent action on a state
claim for false imprisonment. The court stated:
In the case at bar, the pleadings in the Federal Court failed to state a cause
of action, the action was dismissed for that reason, and no trial was had on the
merits.
In this case, there would be no justification for [the federal judge] to hear
the state claim if no federal claim was found and no trial on the merits was
held. Indeed, in our opinion, the federal court would have been abusing its
discretion if it had invoked pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 502-03, 287 N.E.2d at 908.
See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
66 In the default context, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra, the judicial
economy argument would support a rule of no-bar. Nevertheless, courts have apparently




Second fully supports allowing the plaintiff a chance to litigate the
omitted state claim in these circumstances.
6
1
Determining the proper application of the Restatement Second
rule is most difficult when the dismissal of the federal claim
occurs after the pleading stage. Such a dismissal may follow a mo-
don to dismiss for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6)61 or
a motion for summary judgment under rule 56.69 Federal courts
have great leeway in exercising pendent jurisdiction in these
circumstances,7" so the state court's decision whether to bar the
plaintiff's suit on the omitted state claim is particularly difficult.
When the federal dismissal occurs before trial, the state court
should presume that the federal court would have declined to ex-
ercise pendent jurisdiction had the plaintiff initially asserted the
state claim and thus allow the plaintiff to bring a second suit.7'
Although the federal court might, in some instances, choose to
hear the pendent claim after dismissing the underlying federal
claim before trial,72 the suggested presumption is consistent with
the Gibbs guideline 73 and provides state courts with a workable
standard for applying the Restatement Second rule. Barring the
plaintiff's subsequent suit regardless of the timing of the federal
dismissal would encourage the plaintiff to assert both claims in
the first action; however, such a rule is inconsistent with the dis-
cretionary aspect of pendent jurisdiction and is too harsh toward
an unsuspecting plaintiff. Under the suggested approach, only the
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs § 61.1, Comment e, Illustration 10 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 25] ("unless it is clear that the federal court would have declined as a
matter of discretion to exercise [pendent] jurisdiction (for example, because the federal
claim, though substantial, was dismissed in advance of trial), the state action is barred").
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Id. 56. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d) permits the court to postpone its decision on a pretrial
motion until trial. The timing of the dismissal, rather than the timing of the motion, is
relevant because the discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction depends largely on the
amount of judicial resources expended.
70 See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
7' See Merry v. Coast Community College Dist., 97 Cal. App. 3d 214, 229-30, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 603, 612-13 (1979); Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Wakehouse Motors, Inc., 46
Or. App. 199, 611 P.2d 658, 662 (1980). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 383-84
(Del. Ch. 1980) (discussed at note 76 infra). In Merry, the court considered at length the res
judicata effect of a summary judgment on a federal claim before trial. The court held that
the federal judgment did not bar the subsequent state proceeding. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 232,
158 Cal. Rptr. at 614. The court stated, "[W]e have concluded that since it clearly appears
that the federal court would have declined to exercise its pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate
plaintiff's state claims had they been raised, the [federal court] summary judgment is not a
bar to the maintenance of the instant action." Id. at 222, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
72 See note 35 supra.
7' See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
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presumption for or against preclusion shifts with the timing of
the dismissal.74
When the court dismisses the federal claim during trial, on
the other hand, the state court should presume that the federal
court would have exercised pendent jurisdiction and bar the
plaintiff's subsequent action. 75  The policy of judicial economy,
promoted by both pendent jurisdiction and the doctrine of res
judicata, supports preclusion in this situation, because a trial con-
sumes a substantial amount of judicial resources. The strength of
the presumptions for and against preclusion may depend upon
how much time and energy the court actually expended before
dismissing the case.76
74 For example, the state court would bar the plaintiff's second suit following a federal
pretrial dismissal if the defendant showed that the federal court invested substantial time
in the case before dismissal and the plaintiff failed to present proof of countervailing
factors. See note 76 infra.
75 The plaintiff would not be barred, of course, if he showed that the federal court
would have refused to hear the state claim because of potential jury confusion or because
of the predominantly state nature of the case. See note 43 supra.
76 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980). Maldonado presents a compli-
cated procedural situation in which the court reversed the usual presumption of no-bar
when summary judgment is entered before trial. The plaintiff in Maldonado first instituted
a state court action, and then a federal action. While the state suit was pending, the plain-
tiff asserted both his state and federal claims in federal court. The court dismissed the
federal claims pursuant to a rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the state claims because no
federal claims remained. Id. at 380. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower
court's dismissal of one federal claim and remanded with instuctions to the district court to
determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. On remand, the
plaintiff amended his complaint to delete his state claims before the court decided the
pendent jurisdiction question. The defendant then moved for summary judgment on the
federal claim; the court granted the motion. Id. at 380-81.
Subsequently, in the state court, the defendant raised the res judicata defense. The
court held the plaintiff's action barred, placing the burden of showing that the federal
court would not have exercised pendent jurisdiction on the plaintiff. Id. at 384. This
aberration from the suggested presumption of no-bar is justified by two factors which the
state court could glean from the record itself. First, the plaintiff intentionally deleted his
state claims from the federal complaint, apparently attempting to insure that he would
have two opportunities to litigate one claim. Second, the district court and the court of
appeals had spent considerable time on the case; thus, the district court would probably
have heard the state claims to avoid needless waste of judicial resources.
The Maldonado court, however, went somewhat astray on one point. It asserted that
the plaintiff always "must ... show that there was some impediment to the presentation of
his entire claim ... in the [federal] ... forum." Id. Although the particular facts of the case
before it justified the court's statement, the presumption should not always be in favor of




The difficulties state courts encounter in determining the
preclusive effect of federal actions in which the plaintiff omitted a
related state claim derive from the complexities of the Gibbs doc-
trine. Although the Restatement Second does not eliminate these
complexities, it provides courts with a concise statement of the
relationship between pendent jurisdiction and res judicata. In
dealing with the problem of the omitted state claim, state courts
should look first to the ground on which the federal court dis-
posed of the federal claim to determine whether that court had
the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction. If the federal court
reached the merits of the federal claim, the state court should
examine the timing of the dismissal to gauge the judicial re-
sources expended in the initial action. Dismissal on the pleadings
and judgment following a full trial stand at opposite ends of the
spectrum; cases falling between these extremes will continue to
trouble state courts, but the above suggestions, based on the pol-
icy of judicial economy, should assist courts in reaching principled
and fair decisions.
Mark Jay Altschuler
19811 625

